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Unyielding Selflessness:  
Relational negotiations, dementia and care  
 
Abstract 
This article addresses how couples within care relationships engage in 
negotiations when mutual selflessness is the relational starting point. 
Evaluation of hypothetical dementia care scenarios offers insights into 
pressures upon joint decision-making. Strategic interaction models such as 
‘the prisoner’s dilemma’ focus on how a person’s pursuit of self-interested 
preferences might be impeded by the self-interest of another person. 
Scrutiny of negotiations within care relationships demonstrates that 
selflessness can also present significant challenges, as combined 
strategies of altruistic intent mean that neither party is able to prioritise the 
other person successfully. Moreover, sociocultural pressures associated 
with illness and care mean that alternative strategic options are difficult to 
pursue. Care deliberations, predicated on mutual selflessness, can 
therefore present a static and unyielding interactional context for both 
parties to endure. The exploration of relational negotiations highlights the 
requirement to understand the complex breadth of factors that shape 
experience. This can accordingly enhance academic understandings of the 
relational basis of dementia and care, as well as informing the approaches 
of policymakers. 
 




Dementia can generate significant practical and emotional difficulties with which 
people with the condition and their family members must contend. Not only is dementia 
a terminal condition, but its neurodegenerative basis impacts upon memory, 
communication and behaviour, and is also likely to generate intense pressures within 
relationships (Hughes 2011). This means that sensitive decisions on the nature of care 
and professional support will often need to be undertaken. Morally challenging 
deliberations on the most suitable site for care, such as a choice between informal 
care within the family home and professionalised formal care, might require 
demanding negotiations (Author 2015). This complex context presents dilemmas for 
policymakers and healthcare professionals with regard to how the decision-making of 
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people in care relationships can be facilitated. The aim of this article is to pursue an 
advanced theoretical apprehension of care relationships and the inevitable moral 
negotiations which are considered an essential and defining part of the delivery and 
receipt of good care. In particular we will explore the competing moral demands 
inherent in many care relationships of a) not wanting to be a burden and b) not wanting 
to abdicate the responsibility of caring.  
 
In terms of societal discourses, people with severe chronic conditions are often 
positioned as passive and subordinate (Charmaz 1994). Additionally, as a 
consequence of its neurodegenerative basis, dementia presents distinctive challenges 
as an illness-state. Norms and values associated with mental competence provide a 
societal background against which people with dementia are judged negatively 
(Williams et al. 2012). This discursive constitution thus positions people with dementia 
as the passive other, who is dependent on care and support (Dean & Rogers 2004). 
A person with dementia is accordingly prone to being positioned as burdensome to 
family members (and society more widely) (Hughes et al. 2005). Under the societal 
imperative of staying active and independent, being dependent upon others is 
constructed as a highly defective state which those who consider themselves active 
citizens should seek to avoid at all costs (Author 2015).  
 
Parallel to these discourses on illness, dementia and becoming a burden, those who 
provide care within family settings are judged with reference to principles of personal 
devotion and duty (Fine 2005). This mode of care can be understood through the 
‘commitment model’ in which “we see responsibilities as commitments which are built 
up over time between specific individuals” (Finch 1995, p. 54). However, beyond 
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individual commitment the family also embodies rules about proper emotional 
behaviour (Svašek 2008) through which ideal care is positioned as a ‘labour of love’ 
(Kittay 1999), a designation that includes stereotypical images of women’s work 
representing gendered patterns and cultures (Aboim 2010). Both family commitment 
and the emotional imperative favour a notion of altruistic care in which “the more the 
carer attends to the needs of others at the expense of her own, the better mother, wife, 
or daughter she will be in the eyes of others and possibly herself” (Pettersen 2012, p. 
368). Ideal care within a couple or the family, as a consequence, is seen as a selfless 
act completely focusing on the other’s needs (Pettersen 2012). Bahr and Bahr (2001) 
even criticise the negative connotation of self-sacrifice and argue that personal 
conduct within the family should eschew the primacy of individual freedom. Pettersen 
(2012) also warns, however, that such an altruistic understanding of care necessarily 
also requires an imbalanced personal perspective (i.e. a complete focus on the cared-
for), which can be seen as equivalent to self-interest. It must therefore be recognised 
that there are complex intersections between one-sided self-interest and selflessness. 
The two orientations furthermore become interrelated when a person derives personal 
satisfaction from selfless actions (Ridley, 1997). 
 
Linked to these attitudes and behaviours are physical and ideational settings within 
which the moral obligations and associations are expressed: the home as a site of 
care is contrasted with the institutional realm of paid work, professionalisation and 
bureaucracy (Meis et al 2007; Author 2015). The alignment of the home with natural 
values of love, affection and selflessness contrasts with the materialistic motivations 
related to the sphere of paid employment. Associated with these constructions, the 
traditional heterosexual family, and in particular marriage, is defined as the “supreme 
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caring relationship, rivalled perhaps only by the mother/infant bond” (Ungerson 1987, 
p.51). Formal contexts of care, in contrast, are constructed as impersonal, 
bureaucratic domains, which are shaped by instrumental principles.  
 
These dichotomous constructions place pressure upon family carers to ensure that 
support can be sustained within the loving locus of the home, with the need to access 
impersonal professional care minimised or avoided. At the same time, they can 
reinforce a moral imperative on the part of the care receiver to avoid relying too heavily 
on their own partner. The two moral demands, however, do not operate independently 
from each other. Bartlett and O’Connor (2010) argue that social scientific 
understandings of dementia should account for the interplay between personal 
experiences, interpersonal relationships and broader societal contexts. In the literature 
the feminist ethics of care approach (Tronto 1993) has made crucial contributions to 
an understanding of interdependency and “reciprocity between partners, exchanges 
between dependent actors over time, and the networking of these relations of 
dependence” (Fine & Glendinning 2005, p. 612). However, mutual reciprocity can be 
a challenge to attain within care relationships, particularly when a person has dementia 
(Kittay 2009).  
 
While the concept of interdependency acknowledges concrete relations, the 
competing demands sketched above endure and still need to be negotiated. Likewise, 
the ideal of selflessness might supersede individualised notions of self-interested 
behaviour, but (as this article will explore) a relational ‘starting point’ of mutual 
selflessness can still generate collisions of intent that are very difficult to circumvent. 
Commitment and altruistic intentions can be understood as moral principles which, 
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however, need to be actively mobilised in negotiations about the ‘proper thing to do’ 
and the decisions being made (Finch & Mason 2000).  
 
In order to disentangle the negotiation of moral demands and pressures we will utilise 
principles of strategic interaction, which offer a valuable lens through which we can 
obtain a richer sociological understanding of relational contexts defined by 
interdependency. This does not mean that interaction is being granted analytical 
sovereignty, but that it provides an invaluable starting point for scrutinising the breadth 
of elements that shape the experience of dementia and care. Analytical resources from 
strategic interaction (outlined below) provide a platform for the exploration of social 
scientific conceptualisations of dementia and relationships and how these should be 
contextualised. Analysis of decision-making via the key principles of strategic 
interaction will help to illuminate how such intersecting pressures might be articulated 
within relational settings.  
 
Our analysis of deliberations on care start with an ‘ideal type’ model, under which it is 
assumed that remaining in the family home is preferable (whenever practicable) to 
accessing a formal care setting. This is in no way a criticism of formal care delivery, 
but merely reflects the cultural constructions discussed above. These sociocultural 
standards and pressures will influence decision-making within relational settings. With 
the nature of care relationships in mind, this article will consider how these are 






Analysis: From Strategic Interaction to Relational Negotiations  
Strategic interaction (or game theory) is an approach to understanding the negotiation 
of combined decision-making (Goffman 1969). If an individual is making a decision on 
their own then this can be undertaken in a relatively straightforward manner with the 
goal and outcome clearly aligned. If the person is engaged in a negotiation with 
another individual, however, then the link between goal and outcome is rendered more 
complex.  
 
A well-known approach to strategic interaction is provided by ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’ 
model. Within the hypothetical setting of the prisoner’s dilemma, two people are 
arrested for a crime and must negotiate with the authorities with regard to their 
sentence. These two people cannot communicate with one another or collude, but as 
part of a deal are offered the opportunity to stay silent (thus cooperating with their 
partner) or confess to the crime (thus defecting). The challenge is that the choices 
made by one prisoner intersect with the choices made by the other. Table 1 shows 


























This demonstrates that the optimal combined choice would be for Melanie and 
Natasha to stay silent as they then each serve only two years in prison. However, the 
best individual response, when considering how the other person might respond, is to 
confess. Melanie’s best response to Natasha staying silent is to confess (as she would 
walk free rather than serving two years); and Melanie’s best response to Natasha 
confessing is to confess also (as she serves 5 rather than 15 years).  
 
The ‘equilibrium’ of this game (Binmore, 2005) is therefore for both parties to confess, 
despite the fact that both staying silent would be the optimal shared outcome. Under 
this game format, the best individual strategy (confessing) is incommensurate with the 
best combined decision (both players staying silent). Game theoretical principles thus 
demonstrate that combined decision-making, and its associated conflicts of interest, 
mean that two people will encounter impediments to achieving an ideal joint outcome.  
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Drawing upon principles of strategic interaction, examples of decision-making in 
relation to care arrangements will now be explored. In similar fashion to the ‘ideal type’ 
of interaction proposed under game theoretic principles, our approach does not try to 
detail all specific motivational influences upon decision-making (Binmore, 2005). The 
point is not to squeeze every aspect of life into the strategic interaction format, “but to 
create an idealized version of what happens when collective and individual interests 
are in conflict” (Ridley 1997, p.56). Exploration of the prisoner’s dilemma model is 
valuable in the context of this article, as it broaches the matter of two self-interested 
people seeking the best outcome for themselves. This provides a platform for the 
consideration of interdependency within care relationships where the personal 
rewards for each player are essentially inverted with reference to the various combined 
outcomes. While the basis of strategic interaction is the combined decision-making of 
two self-interested parties, this article explores how an alternative dilemma might 
affect people in care relationships, with pressures to be selfless impacting upon 
available options. That is, how are dyadic relationships negotiated when both parties 
are presented with strong sociocultural pressures to place the other person’s needs 
before their own?  
 
To explore the pressures that shape decision-making a number of abstract scenarios 
involving this couple will be explored with broad reference to the principles of strategic 
interaction (or game theory). Crossley (2011) highlights that this approach is a useful 
way of subjecting the strategic interaction to detailed analysis. He also warns, 
however, against the abstractions of game theory and the fact it denies the resources 




Taking heed of Crossley’s concerns, the goal of this article is not to advance a pure 
and asocial model of strategic interaction. The intention is to draw upon its 
underpinning principles to demonstrate the inherent challenges to negotiations within 
care relationships. While strategic interaction models valuably help to illuminate 
decision-making strategies when the intentions of both players are difficult to reconcile, 
we move beyond the narrow, discrete game theoretical approach in pursuit of a more 
sociological model. For example, we consider how different third party influences will 
shape decision-making. We also address how broader social and temporal contexts 
must shape settings of interaction and negotiation. To underscore this broader 
contextualisation, we define our own models as ‘relational negotiations’ rather than 
‘strategic interaction’ (or ‘game theory’). 
 
To explore the challenges that inhere within care relationships we will explore the 
interactions between a (hypothetical) couple, Alan and Barbara. This couple are 
married and live at home together within a ‘care relationship’ shaped by the experience 
of dementia. An evaluation of their combined decision-making, under three different 
scenarios, shows how care is allocated based upon negotiations when both parties 
are operating from a position of selfless intent.  
 
Scenario one: The ‘care deliberation’ 
The first scenario addresses a situation where both Alan and Barbara have dementia 
and therefore care for one another. To abstract the decision-making mechanisms for 
scrutiny, it is assumed that they both have the same level of mental capacity and scope 
to communicate effectively. Within this first hypothetical example, a professional has 
recommended that they require a break from supporting one another, as a 
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consequence of the practical and emotional challenges this is presenting to them both. 
It is proposed that a ten-day break utilising some format of formal care (such as respite 
care) would be beneficial. Whereas the prisoner’s dilemma requires both parties to be 
kept apart to prevent collusion, under this care deliberation model Alan and Barbara 
are able to address this negotiation on a face-to-face basis. 
 
There are different ways that the days in formal care can be allocated, depending on 
the combination of decisions: 
 
 One member of the couple could spend all 10 days in a formal care setting, with 
the other person staying within the family home.  
 
 The allocation could be divided equally between both members of the couple, 
with each of them spending five days at home sequentially (while the other 
person is in formal care for the corresponding period).   
 
 If both members of the couple opt to stay in the family home then a compromise 
is agreed with the professional and they would both spend a shorter period in 
formal care (two days each).  
 


















What is distinctive in settings pertaining to illness and informal care is the pressure to 
place the other person first. The prisoner’s dilemma is based upon the premise that 
both parties will seek the shortest sentence possible for themselves. In this care-
setting example, the pressure is likely to skew the decision-making in the opposite 
direction, with each person seeking to minimise the amount of time the other person 
spends within the formal setting.1 This relates to the social constructions of illness, 
care and dependency addressed in the introduction: under this ‘ideal type’ model there 
will be pressure upon both parties to minimise the period of time the other person 
spends in formal care. Under the ‘care deliberation’, selflessness means that the best 
individual response is to select ‘formal care’ whatever the other person chooses. 
 
                                                          
1 The prisoner’s dilemma merely provides insights into principles of strategic interaction. In no way are we 
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 If Barbara chooses formal care, and Alan chooses formal care then Alan 
spends 5 days in formal care (rather than Alan spending 10 days in formal care 
if Barbara had chosen family home). 
 
 If Barbara chooses formal care, and Alan chooses family home then Alan 
spends 0 days in formal care (rather than Alan spending 2 days in formal care 
if Barbara had chosen family home). 
 
Crucially, from these combined responses based on selflessness, neither Barbara nor 
Alan is able to minimise the number of days the other will spend in formal care. The 
selfless desire to spend all 10 days in formal care while the other person remains at 
home will be gainsaid by the other person’s selfless strategy. With reference to this 
standard, a ‘selfless equilibrium’ is the third-best outcome of four (with 5 days the 
outcome, rather than 2 days or 0 days).  
 
Taking into account the pressures presented by these negotiations, Table 3 ascribes 
figures to the reward (or payoff) for each person depending on the combination of 
choices. These figures are based on the sense of value ascribed to each outcome 
based on selflessness and the individual’s goal to spend more time in formal care than 
their partner. As per game theoretic principles, the exact numbers are not important. 
‘Ordinal payoffs’ are allocated: these serve as a shorthand to rank the desirability of 


















These reward values show how social standards of selflessness will place pressures 
on the interactional domain, and how rewards differ from those conferred under 
versions of games where self-interest is the starting point for negotiations. The 
rewards accordingly diverge from the rewards under the prisoner’s dilemma, when the 
best individual outcome arises from a self-interested strategy. Whereas altruism can 
prove costly under the prisoner’s dilemma, it is self-interest that proves costly under 
the formal care dilemma: within the care deliberation the greatest risk is placing one’s 
own needs first when the other person chooses a selfless strategy.  
 
If Alan chooses to stay at home but Barbara does not, then she will spend all 10 days 
in the formal care facility. Alan’s decision has a negative impact upon Barbara and his 
self-interest is also contrasted with Barbara’s selflessness. The perception that this 
would leave him open to judgement and social censure means that Alan is likely to 
seek to avoid the lowest reward. The same criteria apply to Barbara’s decision-making. 
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If both parties choose to stay at home they could leave themselves open to negative 
social judgement. This strategy risked placing the other person within the formal care 
setting for 10 days (although the combined choice has prevented this from happening 
and does show a joint orientation within the couple). Nevertheless, Barbara choosing 
this option has still obstructed Alan from spending all 10 days in the family home (and 
vice versa). The professional’s recommendation has also been eschewed by both 
members of the couple. This is therefore scored as a moderately negative position. 
 
Both parties are therefore likely to select ‘formal care’ and this produces the highest 
combined reward. The fact that individual preferences (based on selflessness) form 
the highest joint reward implies that the interdependent negotiation, in this instance, 
leads to an efficient and positive outcome. As discussed above, however, this 
equilibrium prevents each player from achieving their strategy to put the other person 
first i.e. allowing the other person to obtain the maximum reward. It also presents 
challenges with regard to how interactional exchanges within the couple can develop. 
As noted above, the prisoner’s dilemma requires decisions to be taken in isolation to 
render a joint strategy difficult to formulate. Alternatively, a collision of mutual selfless 
intent is likely to undergird the care deliberation, whether or not both parties are able 
to communicate directly with each other. 
 
Scenario two: Third party influences upon the care deliberation 
Under the prisoner’s dilemma, two people must seek the best outcome between 
themselves without regard for any third party. The care deliberation, however, includes 
a recommendation being made by a professional. It is not just the thoughts and 
15 
 
feelings of the partner that must be considered, but also the professional who has 
made the recommendation. For example, if one or both members of the couple 
resisted the professional recommendation, then this could leave them open to 
perceived critical judgement from the professional and others. Nevertheless, it is also 
feasible that the couple could derive satisfaction from coping independently and 
eschewing ‘expert’ opinion. The perceived social judgement could therefore be more 
positive: the couple are able to manage privately in their family home and minimise 
their utilisation of professional (and possibly state-funded) resources. This outcome 
thereby meets cultural standards of independence, self-sufficiency and 
resourcefulness.  
 
What could embed the selfless equilibrium further, however, is if the recommendation 
to utilise formal care was presented to the couple by a family member, particularly a 
younger family member such as a son or daughter. If the members of the couple feel 
that they are presenting a challenge to younger family members, then this is very likely 
to generate pressures that exceed the perceived impact on a professional. On one 
level this could be argued to have a genetic basis (i.e. kinship altruism) with parents 
seeking to optimise conditions for younger family members (Axelrod 1984). In addition, 
actions and beliefs are culturally influenced, and older people might feel that they will 
be judged negatively if they impede younger family members who are situated in 
‘productive adulthood’ (Author 2018).  
 
Under this particular instance of an interdependent negotiation, it is not just a case of 
considering the impacts of decisions upon one another, but impacts upon other family 
members. The urge not to be a burden, and to place younger family members’ needs 
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first will alter the rewards. Adopting a self-interested approach under such 
circumstances could present very intense challenges and could further embed the 
fixed decision-making equilibrium discussed above. Table 4 shows how the rewards 
are affected if the recommendation for formal care is prompted by a family member. 
Selfless decision-making is granted a higher figure and self-interested decision-
making is ranked more negatively with, as a corollary, the contrast between the two 
strategies rendered more significant. Therefore, there is an even greater chance that 
‘formal care’ will be chosen by both Alan and Barbara.  
 











Scenario three: the care deliberation when one member of the couple has dementia 
The final interactional situation adjusts the status of the participants: in this example it 
is only Alan who has dementia. The interdependent negotiation thus relates to whether 
the person with dementia should spend a period in formal care due to the challenges 
being experienced by Alan and Barbara in the family home. In this example, it could 
be argued that the ultimate decision should reside with the person with dementia as 
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they will be most directly affected by the outcome. Within relationships, however, 
significant life decisions will be shared to some extent and there will be a joint element 
to such negotiations. The practical and emotional impacts of the outcome will also 
affect both parties, so the decision-making remains interdependent. The reward values 
in Table 5 show the potential impact of the choices and how they interrelate. 
 











Alan is presented with the pressure not to impose excessive challenges upon Barbara. 
If he remains at home then he risks compounding these challenges. His concern for 
her needs, allied to the risk of receiving negative social judgements for imposing these 
challenges, increases the likelihood that he will opt for formal care. Barbara, on the 
other hand, is presented with similar concerns for Alan’s well-being and the 
requirements to offer him selfless and committed support so that he can stay at home.  
 
Alan scores negatively if he opts to remain within the family home, adding to the 
pressure of Barbara’s care role, but scores positively if he puts her needs first and 
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chooses formal care. The opposite applies to Barbara, who scores negatively if she 
chooses formal care, but scores positively if she prefers Alan to stay at home. The 
scores are asymmetric to show that the carer will experience greater perceived 
pressures in relation to their decisions. The moral pressure to put the other person first 
will impact most heavily on the individual within the relationship who does not have the 
condition. Barbara is also likely to fear being judged particularly negatively if she opts 
for formal care when Alan prefers to stay in the family home. Seeking to avoid the 
social stigma associated with this combination of preferences places further pressure 
on the carer to choose that the person with dementia should stay at home. 
 
It has been highlighted that gender does not alter player strategies when game theory 
is abstracted from social pressures (Brañas-Garza 2006). Within a care relationship 
however, cultural and moral factors related to gender will strongly intersect with these 
rewards. For example, the cultural association of feminine values with good care 
(Ungerson 2000) could also mean that female carers could feel distinctive pressures 
when negotiating decisions. In addition, men with dementia might also encounter 
distinctive challenges related to masculinity and illness. For example, to demonstrate 
that they have the resilience to cope with their circumstances (and to avoid imposing 
upon others) men might feel pressured to accept external support (Author 2017a). 
Alternatively, male carers and women with dementia might also encounter certain 
social and cultural pressures associated with gender roles and expectations.  
 
In terms of rewards aligned with the expressed statements by both parties there 
appears to be an equilibrium within this negotiation: Barbara and Alan both score 
positively if the former chooses ‘family home’ and the latter chooses ‘formal care’. This 
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presents a tenuous situation, as it does not provide an implementable outcome: there 
is no consensus on the choice that should be made. If an iterated version of this 
deliberation needed to be followed until there is a resolution, eventually either Barbara 
or Alan would have to accept a negative score. A workable outcome would require 
someone adopting a ‘selfish’ position, thereby accepting a reduced reward and its 
associated emotional impacts.    
 
Discussion: Understanding Care Deliberations 
Conceptualising interaction  
Building upon the examples of strategic interaction above, this discussion pursues a 
balanced and contextualised perspective of care relationships that inter alia draws 
upon concepts from relational sociology. Archer and Donati (2015) invoke concepts 
that address the various dimensions that inhere within relational settings. Me-ness 
relates to the actor setting out to satisfy their own preferences; thee-ness pertains to 
seeking to inhabit the other person’s point of view and aspirations; while we-ness 
refers to an emergent (and processual) collective agreement. The rewards in the 
examples above show that, operating from an orientation of me-ness, Barbara will 
seek to position Alan’s needs first. This is to obtain positive feelings associated with 
selflessness in a close relationship and also favourable social judgement. This is 
accordingly rooted in a sense of thee-ness, which is a contemplation of the 
preferences of Alan i.e. a desire to spend as little time as possible in formal care. There 
accordingly appears to be a functional and sustainable melding of me-ness and thee-
ness, based upon selflessness and the personal rewards this confers. The challenge 
is that Alan is also adopting the same approach and is seeking the positive 




By both persons adopting the same stance, therefore, there is a collision of 
selflessness rather than a dovetailing of intentions. From a perspective of me-ness, 
both Barbara and Alan want to put the other person first: an overt selflessness. Thee-
ness also means the time spent in formal care is not the only consideration; both 
parties will also be aware that the other person will also wish to adopt an overtly 
selfless strategy. Somewhat paradoxically, thee-ness would therefore require Barbara 
to put herself ‘first’ so that Alan’s selfless strategy can be rewarded (and vice versa). 
It is accordingly the self-interested stance (choosing to stay at home) that becomes a 
reoriented selflessness.  
 
This consequently presents a significant challenge: under these terms, if Barbara 
suppressed her own overt selfless needs (she allowed Alan to adopt an unimpeded 
selfless strategy) it could simply be viewed that Barbara has followed a self-interested 
strategy (minimising her own time in formal care). One member of the dyad adopting 
this reoriented selfless strategy could thus potentially have a negative emotional 
impact upon the other person (despite being employed with good intentions). In 
addition, if both Alan and Barbara both choose to suppress their own overt selfless 
needs respectively, then this could present challenges for both parties with regard to 
how they present a positive impression of the relationship. These pressures combine 
to ensure that selflessness continues to be oriented to minimising the other person’s 
stay in formal care. The interactional and social challenges inherent in other modes of 
selflessness (i.e. enabling the other person’s overt selfless strategy to predominate) 




The problem this generates is that interaction will be highly constrained. Game theory 
differentiates between the so-called ‘one shot’ prisoner’s dilemma, where the 
deliberation takes place on just one occasion, and when the game is iterative (i.e. 
ongoing) for an unspecified number of games. While the equilibrium in a one-off game 
is to opt for a narrow self-interested strategy, under the iterated format more 
cooperative strategies evolve; for example, a ‘tit-for-tat’ format can become the 
equilibrium whereby the person responds to the other person’s previous decision 
(Axelrod 1984). That is, if one person cooperated on the previous attempt then the 
person playing tit-for-tat would cooperate on the next occasion the game is played.  
 
With this care deliberation it is difficult to envisage how an iterated version of the game 
would lead to an adjustment of strategy, as both players are actually commencing from 
a selfless position. The desire to be selfless and the fear of negative social judgement 
mean that the outcome of the one-off game is likely to be repeated. Commencing from 
a basis of self-interest leads to a dynamic non-zero-sum game whereby various 
interactional strategies can evolve. Selflessness as a starting point leads to a static 
game whereby one strategy is fixed and entrenched. This calls into question how 
‘cooperation’ can be defined under this ‘care deliberation’. Both people placing the 
other person’s needs before their own does not constitute a joint strategy. When the 
aim in the first instance is selflessness, somewhat paradoxically it becomes harder to 
generate a collaborative sense of we-ness and a breadth of relational goods (Donati 
& Archer 2015). Whereas the self-interest of the prisoner’s dilemma is predicated on 
a non-zero-sum situation, with an optimal joint outcome available, the selfless 
pressures of the care deliberation (and the associated problem of defining 
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cooperation) mean that it actually becomes very difficult to apply zero-sum logic to the 
nature of the negotiations.  
 
This demonstrates that relational negotiations undertaken within contexts of altruism 
and mutuality can still generate individualised outcomes. Conflicting individual intent 
could be particularly hard to unravel when selflessness underpins the context of 
negotiations: attributes such as trust, duty and empathy might moderate the narrow 
utilitarian calculations inherent in the payoffs of the prisoner’s dilemma (Crossley 
2011), but they actually undergird a recalcitrant selfless conflict of interest within the 
care deliberation. This is not to deny that these attributes are anything other than 
commendable at an individual level, but merely highlights that a deontological morality 
might not always be conducive to collaborative decision-making at a relational level. 
The ‘care deliberation’ not only means that selfless strategies are an unsuccessful 
means for putting the other person’s needs first, but also generates a very challenging 
relational context. A relational context without scope for manoeuvre or development 
of interactional strategies could become strained and even toxic. 
 
This recognition provides the platform for an evaluation of the current social scientific 
conceptualisations of dementia and care relationships. The importance of 
relationships in dementia care is highlighted by the concept of personhood, which 
asserts that the person’s relational and social context can enhance the experience of 
the condition. Personhood is defined as “a standing or status that is bestowed upon 
one human being, by others, in the context of relationships and social being. It implies 
recognition, respect and trust” (Kitwood 1997, p.8). This approach to understanding 
the experience of dementia also highlights that negative behaviours expressed by 
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carers can generate a ‘malignant social psychology’ that is damaging to people with 
the condition.  
 
Kitwood’s concept of personhood rejects a narrow individualised illness-centred 
perspective to recognise the importance of interaction between the person with the 
condition and other people. The concept has been critiqued, however, for understating 
the extent to which the person with dementia shapes their own relational 
circumstances. The notion of personhood as ‘status bestowed’ underplays the agential 
scope of the person with dementia and suggests that their experience is something 
imposed upon them by others (Higgs & Gilleard 2015). There is therefore a 
requirement to develop a more bi-directional interactive understanding within 
dementia studies (Bartlett & O’Connor 2010).  
 
Evaluation that draws upon principles of strategic interaction contributes to this pursuit 
of a more balanced and bi-directional perspective of relationships. While it is of course 
vital to scrutinise individual behaviours within care environments, difficulties do not 
only arise from one person employing negative behaviours. Analysis of relational 
negotiations demonstrates that challenges within relationships could still emerge when 
both parties are committed, dutiful and selfless. Difficulties can arise from the complex 
nature of interdependency itself.   
 
Academic endeavours have sought to build upon Kitwood’s approach to personhood. 
For example, there is also a burgeoning strand of literature that promotes the concept 
of couplehood. Couplehood reinforces the relational basis of personhood, asserting 
that the importance of relationships means that the couple should be seen as the key 
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ontological unit (for those in spousal relationships). Related to the conceptual 
development of couplehood is the tendency to promote a unified and positive view of 
relationships. Positive language associated with unity and togetherness is associated 
with literature that draws upon the couplehood concept; for example being ‘a team’ 
(Hernandez et al. 2015), an ‘us’ identity (Davies 2011) and doing things together 
(Hellström et al. 2005). This rhetoric aligns with ‘living well with dementia’ policy 
discourses (e.g. Department of Health 2009).  
 
Exploration of relational negotiations and care relationships endorses elements of the 
couplehood concept, as it highlights that relationships have emergent properties that 
cannot be reduced to an aggregation of individual intent. Decisions, choices and 
actions “are not purely individual acts, but are arrived at in relation to and with others” 
(Donati & Archer 2015, p.15). Nevertheless, this relational perspective is based upon 
recognition of the complex and emergent basis of interactions between individuals in 
the context of their relationship, rather than any reified sense that couplehood 
comprises a discrete ontological entity. The nature of the couplehood term (with its 
implication of a sovereign dyadic status) and the associated tendency to proffer a 
positive account of experience suggests that the couple represents a hermetic and 
unified whole.   
 
Promoting a sense of togetherness and unity in the endeavour to counter negative 
perspectives on dementia risks misrepresenting the complex basis of care 
relationships and their intrinsic challenges. Analysis of relational negotiations has 
shown that an ‘us’ identity can be difficult to obtain even when the couple is operating 
from a basis of altruism and trust. While there are, of course, challenges to 
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relationships underpinned by discord and conflict, the nature of socially (and morally) 
framed interdependencies means that relationships present challenges even when 
they are positive and mutually supportive. In fact, counterintuitively, a clear sense of 
duty and togetherness could even compound some challenges related to reconciling 
individual and joint decision-making. Relational subjectivity is therefore not a pre-
existing state of couplehood, but is an ongoing project (and challenge). “To maintain 
that the subject is relational means that he/she is part of a ‘We’ that is not a 
superordinate entity but is, instead, a relation” (Donati & Archer 2015). 
 
Contextualising interaction 
The utilitarian orientation of standard models of strategic interaction understate 
contextual factors. It is presumed that, as a central authority does not feature within 
the biological domain, regularised outcomes of relations must only be a bottom-up 
formulation, founded on kinship or reciprocity (Axelrod 1984). This can only be a partial 
account, as it does not capture how the interactional domain is also shaped in a top-
down fashion by emergent social phenomena. To fully appreciate the challenges of 
care relationships, a deeper sociological appreciation of relational negotiations is 
therefore required. 
 
Traditional approaches to strategic interaction tend to offer a ‘presentism’ that 
understates wider temporal dimensions that shape interaction. While there is a 
temporal dimension to iterative versions of strategic interaction, this is still only a linear 
sequence of games. An appropriate contextualisation of negotiations within care 
relationships must also take into account a history and future that frames an instance 
(or a sequence) of combined decision-making. That is, the decision-making is shaped 
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by the shared history of the relationship and how this influences each individual and 
the couple. The decision will also be shaped by projections of how actions and 
interactions will affect their interpersonal relations in the future. It is not therefore 
simply the case (as per iterative versions of strategic interaction) that repeated game 
formats are the only temporal dimension that shape relational negotiations. It has to 
be recognised that relationships always arise in context. “Given their pre-existence, 
structural and cultural emergents shape the social environment to be inhabited. These 
results of past actions are deposited in the form of current situations” (Archer 1995, 
p.201).  
 
Moreover, dyads do not have an existence that is detached from wider social networks 
(Crossley 2011): other direct (and indirect) relationships will affect interactions. As has 
been discussed in the analysis above, Alan and Barbara’s direct relationship with a 
key third party (i.e. professional or family member) will affect the basis of the couple’s 
interactions with the situation thereby triadic rather than simply two-way (see also 
Quinn et al, 2013). The decision-making and actions of individuals (and couples) will 
also be strongly shaped by more diffuse sociocultural pressures. These pressures may 
be experienced as a mode of authority, even though they have not been inscribed with 
any formal status. It is not the case that causal influences arise only at the level of 
micro-interactions. Emergent social and cultural phenomena exert top-down influence 
upon situations of co-presence. For example, Mead’s notion of the ‘generalised other’ 
(1967) draws attention to how people will engage with a diffuse social (and moral) 
collective when formulating their decisions and justifying their beliefs/actions. As noted 
in the introduction, an illness-related status might generate particular moral challenges 
related to passivity, dependency and selflessness. In addition, caring also relates to 
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matters of selflessness and coping independently. These can have a deleterious effect 
on those already encountering multiple challenges associated with the intensely 
disruptive impacts of a condition such as dementia.  
 
The requirement for a more contextualised perspective of care environments has 
particular salience within dementia studies. Kitwood’s model of personhood has been 
critiqued for proffering a narrow view of relationships that does not adequately account 
for wider sociocultural influences (Baldwin & Capstick, 2007; Author, 2017b). While 
terms such as ‘personhood’ and ‘person-centred care’ offer an appealing academic 
orientation, they also underpin an individualised needs-based lexicon (Bartlett & 
O’Connor 2010). Moreover, the emphasis on personhood as a status bestowed and 
the dyad as a bounded unit (as per the couplehood concept) further understates the 
breadth of factors that shape experience and relationships. Underplaying broader 
influences means that the interactional domain is the site wherein challenges are 
excessively situated. This narrow contextualisation accordingly lends itself to a model 
oriented to blame (Baldwin & Capstick 2007; Bartlett & O’Connor 2010), with ‘healthy 
others’ (Sabat et al. 2011) held accountable for bestowing malignant social conditions 
upon people with dementia (Davis 2004).  
 
Conclusion 
Scrutiny of relational negotiations in this article has valuably highlighted the challenge 
of reconciling personal and joint goals when both parties are seeking to prioritise the 
other person. Drawing upon principles of strategic interaction, this analytical process 
has demonstrated that, even in the context of respect and mutuality, the interactional 
domain can present impediments to personal (altruistic) intentions. This feature of care 
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relationships must be acknowledged if enhanced relational understandings of the 
experience of dementia are to be developed.  
 
There is no such thing as an individual preference that can be neatly extracted from 
its relational context, and there are complexities within care relationships that mean 
personal and joint preferences will be particularly difficult to discern (and even define). 
There are accordingly inherent challenges within care relationships that must be 
addressed by professionals seeking to support people with dementia and their family 
members. People within care relationships require a mode of guidance and support 
that can help them navigate the various demands and moral pressures that render 
negotiations difficult. It cannot be assumed people operating within contexts defined 
by altruism, respect and duty will be able to negotiate combined decision-making 
situations successfully. As has been shown above, the input of third parties could even 
compound the collisions of pressures associated with mutual selflessness. People 
seeking to support those in care relationships are thus in a position whereby their well-
meaning influence could exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the challenges of relational 
decision-making.  
 
An associated challenge raised by the insights of relational negotiations is how to 
formulate appropriate policy responses to dementia and care, particularly within a 
liberal context where autonomous choice is paramount (Deneen, 2018). When 
decision-making processes are entangled within the complex interdependencies of a 
spousal relationship it proves problematic trying to discern an individual’s best 
interests (and how these can be reconciled with another person’s best interests). For 
example, when the person with dementia feels pressure not to be a ‘burden’ on others 
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(and will accordingly be accepting of external support) and the carer feels pressure to 
be a good carer (thus eschewing external assistance), in which direction should each 
person (or the couple) be ‘nudged’ (see Halpern, 2015) by policy initiatives? Policy 
must address individuals and relationships to help people sustain and generate 
relational goods.  
 
The requirement for an enhanced theoretical approach to dementia and care 
relationships is not, therefore, simply an abstract and rarefied debate. As has been 
noted above, current conceptualisations of dementia care have been critiqued for 
being narrow and unidirectional, with agential emphasis on the carer. A considered 
sociological approach to strategic interaction helps to redress this balance, as it 
underscores that people’s values and preferences are enmeshed within multi-
directional and contextualised interdependencies of relationships. This recognition of 
the complexity of relationships can help to avoid binary categorisations; for example, 
the alignment of experience with either ‘tragedy’ or ‘living well’ discourses’ (McParland 
et al, 2017). A model that takes relationality as its starting point can account for the 
emergent and fluid reality of relationship formations, but does not elide individual 
preferences and choices under an illegitimate unity associated with a ‘living well’ 
ethos. Appropriate conceptual tools can thus help to prompt a balanced, 
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